Protection of MANETs from a range of attacks using an intrusion detection and prevention system by Nadeem, A & Howarth, MP
Protection of MANETs from a range of attacks using 
an intrusion detection & prevention system  
Adnan Nadeem and Michael Howarth 
 
 
 
 
Abstract   Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are 
well known to be vulnerable to various attacks due to 
their lack of centralized control, and their dynamic 
topology and energy-constrained operation. Much 
research in securing MANETs has focused on proposals 
which detect and prevent a specific kind of attack such 
as sleep deprivation, black hole, grey hole, rushing or 
sybil attacks. In this paper we propose a generalized 
intrusion detection and prevention mechanism. We use 
a combination of anomaly-based and knowledge-based 
intrusion detection to secure MANETs from a wide 
variety of attacks. This approach also has the capability 
to detect new unforeseen attacks. Simulation results of 
a case study shows that our proposed mechanism can 
successfully detect attacks, including multiple 
simultaneous different attacks, and identify and isolate 
the intruders causing a variety of attacks, with an 
affordable network overhead. We also investigate the 
impact on the MANET performance of (a) the various 
attacks and (b) the type of intrusion response, and we 
demonstrate the need for an adaptive intrusion 
response. 
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1. Introduction  
MANETs are an infrastructure-less network of 
autonomous devices, where these devices also act as 
intermediate routers. MANET routing protocols can be 
classified as either proactive or reactive.. Reactive 
routing protocols such as AODV [1] and DSR [2] are 
now considered more effective and scalable compared 
to their proactive counterparts such as OLSR [3], 
because they have less routing overhead. AODV and 
DSR are designed under the assumption that all nodes 
trust each other and there are no malicious intruder 
nodes in the network. Therefore, the presence of any 
such node imposes security challenges. Malicious nodes 
can cause severe disruption through a wide variety of 
attacks including both routing and data forwarding 
attacks. Attacks are generally classified as either passive 
or active attacks. In passive attacks, the attacker does 
not disturb the operation of the network but attempts to 
discover valuable information. On the other hand active 
attacks cause various degrees of damage to the network 
depending on the type of attack; we investigate several 
such attacks in this paper. 
Intrusion detection and prevention (IDP) [4] 
provides a way to protect nodes against active routing 
attacks. There are two intrusion detection (ID) 
techniques, known as knowledge-based intrusion 
detection (KBID) and anomaly-based intrusion 
detection (ABID). KBID maintains a knowledge base 
containing signatures or patterns of known attacks and 
looks for these patterns in an attempt to detect them; for 
example a rule based expert system to detect intrusion 
is proposed in [5]. KBID has a potentially low false 
detection rate but it can only detect attacks whose 
signatures are in the database, and it is difficult to 
gather signatures and keep them up to date. On the 
other hand, ABID can flag observed activities that 
deviate significantly from the established normal 
profile. ABID consist of two phases: training and 
testing. This technique not only provides early warnings 
for potential intrusions but also can detect attempts to 
exploit new and unforeseen vulnerabilities; however, it 
is more prone to generate false positives than KBID.  
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 In our initial work [6] we proposed Adaptive 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention (AIDP), which used 
ABID to detect denial of service (DoS) attacks. In this 
extended version of our paper [25] we propose 
Generalised Intrusion Detection & Prevention (GIDP) 
mechanism. It uses a combination of anomaly-based and 
knowledge-based ID that   takes   advantage   of   both 
techniques to guard MANETs against a wide variety of 
attacks. It has the capability to detect new intrusive 
activities that degrade network performance. We further 
analyze various attacks and their impact on network 
performance and compare this with the impact on 
network performance of GIDP’s intrusion response, 
which is to isolate the intruder from the network. 
Finally, we demonstrate the need of an adaptive 
intrusion response for IDP in MANETs.   
 The reminder of this paper is organized as follows.   
Section 2 describes the related work and challenges in 
intrusion detection and securing MANETs. Section 3 
reviews typical MANET routing attacks. Section 4 
presents our proposed mechanism, GIDP. Section 5 
illustrates the implementation of GIDP through a case 
study, including simulation. Section 6 presents an 
investigation of the impact of various attacks and 
intrusion responses on network performance, again 
including simulation results. Finally, we summarize our 
results and future work in Section 7. 
2. Related Work 
2.1 Intrusion Detection   
      ID in MANETs is more challenging than in fixed 
networks because the former lack a concentration point 
where traffic can be analyzed, and because of their 
dynamic topology and limited computational ability of 
nodes. In spite of these challenges some research in the 
literature has focus on ID in MANETs. For example 
Zhang and Lee[7] argue that many ID techniques 
developed for fixed wired networks are not applicable 
in MANETs, and they propose an ID and response 
mechanism in which an Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) agent performs local data collection and local 
detection. They then trigger a cooperative detection and 
global response when a node reports an intrusion. In [8] 
Hijazi and Nasser studied and analysed the feasibility of 
mobile agents in MANETs and they concluded that 
many mobile agents’ features are the exact requirement 
for MANET IDS. In [9] Cretu et al. proposed an 
anomaly detection approach for MANETs in which it 
models device behavior that peers can use to determine  
trustworthiness of other nodes. Jiang and Wang [10] 
proposed an anomaly detection algorithm based on 
Markov chains for wireless ad hoc networks.   This 
algorithm consists of two parts: the first constructs a 
Markov chain table with state transitions. Then second 
part is a classifier which checks whether the current 
transition is in the Markov chain by calculating trace 
values and setting the threshold to detect anomalies.  
2.2 Securing MANETs 
        A significant research effort has already been 
made to secure MANETs, but most of the work has 
focused on detecting and preventing specific attacks. 
For example TOGBAD was proposed in [11] to identify 
nodes that attempt to create black hole attacks in 
MANETs. It detects the attack using a topology graph, 
looking at the number of neighbours a node claims to 
have and the actual number of neighbours according to 
the graph. It was developed for the OLSR proactive 
routing protocol where the topology information can be 
obtained, but would not be effective for reactive routing 
protocols, where acquiring topology information is not 
operationally feasible. Kurosawa and Jamalipour [12] 
also propose a black hole detection mechanism, this 
time for AODV, where three feature vectors are used to 
model normal states of the network and then a 
discrimination module is used for identifying the 
abnormal state that represents the black hole attack. 
Xiaopeng and Wei [13] propose a grey hole attack 
detection scheme for the DSR routing protocol. This 
requires each node to produce evidence on forwarding 
packets using an aggregated signature algorithm, and 
then a checkup algorithm detects whether packets are 
dropped or not; finally a source node uses a diagnostic 
algorithm to trace the malicious node. Another 
mechanism for grey hole detection for AODV is 
proposed in [14].  Ping and Zhang [15] considered a 
route request (RREQ) flooding attack in MANETs. 
They proposed a RREQ flood prevention mechanism 
based on neighbour’s supervision. In another example 
Yu and Ray [16] defined two types of injecting traffic 
attack in MANETs as query and data packet flooding. 
They detect the attack if requests are made a certain 
number of times in t sec. These methods are based on 
static thresholds to detect malicious RREQ flooding, 
but in our opinion this does not cope well with the 
dynamic environment of MANETs.  In [17] Perrig and 
Johnson analyzed how an attacker can launch a rushing 
attack (RU) in DSR and proposed a rushing attack 
prevention mechanism for MANETs.   
        Though most researchers have concentrated on 
protecting MANETs against specific types of attack, 
some have suggested a more general approach. For 
example ARAN [18] is a hop-to-hop authenticated 
routing mechanism that can protect MANETs against a 
number of attacks from external malicious nodes. A 
similar approach, Ariadne [19], has been proposed for 
end-to-end authentication based on shared key pairs. In 
[20] CRADS, a cross layer approach, is proposed that 
uses a support vector machine (SVM) to detect routing 
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attacks based on the proactive routing protocol OLSR. 
SEAD was proposed in [21] as a secure routing 
protocol that uses a one-way hash function to provide 
authentication for the proactive routing protocol DSDV. 
        We believe more effort is needed on mechanisms 
which can guard MANETs against a wide variety of 
attacks, and especially for reactive routing protocols 
since these are more widely used. 
 
3 Routing Attacks  
         The on-demand MANET routing protocols, such 
as AODV and DSR, allow intruders to launch a wider 
variety of attacks. In order to illustrate these routing 
attacks we consider AODV as an example in this paper. 
Using AODV we now give examples of how different 
intrusive activities can cause various attacks in 
MANETs. 
 
a) Sleep Deprivation through malicious RREQ      
     flooding: 
        Sleep deprivation (SD) [22] is a denial of service 
attack in which an attacker interacts with the node in a 
manner that appears to be legitimate, but where the 
purpose of interaction is to keep the victim node out of 
its power-conserving sleep mode. An intruder can cause 
SD of a node by exploiting the vulnerability of the route 
discovery process of the protocol through malicious 
route request (RREQ) flooding in the following ways: 
 
Malicious RREQ Flooding 1:  an intruder broadcasts a 
RREQ with a destination IP address that is within the 
network address range but which does not exist. This 
will compel all nodes to forward this RREQ because 
no-one will have the route for this destination IP 
address. 
 
Malicious RREQ Flooding 2:  after broadcasting a 
RREQ an intruder does not wait for the ring traversal 
time and continues resending the RREQ for the same 
destination with higher TTL values. 
 
b) Black & Grey Hole attack by false RREP and  
    packet dropping: 
        In AODV, the destination sequence number 
(dest_seq) is used to describe the freshness of the route. 
A higher value of dest_seq means a fresher route. On 
receiving a RREQ an intruder can advertise itself as 
having the fresher route by sending a Route Reply 
(RREP) packet with a new dest_seq number larger than 
the current dest_seq number. In this way the intruder 
becomes part of the route to that destination. The 
intruder can then choose to drop all packets, causing a 
black hole (BH) [12] in the network. The severity of the 
attack depends on the number of routes in the network 
the intruder successfully becomes part of; we analyze 
this further in Section 5.  
      A Grey Hole attack (GH) [14] is a special case of 
the BH attack, in which intruder only drops packets 
selectively, e.g. from specific nodes. 
 
c) Rushing attack through a forged RREQ: 
       In order to limit the routing protocol overhead an 
on-demand protocol only requires nodes to forward the 
first RREQ that arrives for each route discovery.  An 
attacker can exploit this property by spreading RREQ 
packets quickly throughout the network so as to 
suppress any later legitimate RREQ packets. An 
intruder can forward the forged rushed RREQ, giving 
them a higher source sequence (src_seq) number and 
minimum delay. This will suppress the later legitimate 
RREQ and increase the probability that routes that 
include the intruder will be discovered rather than other 
valid routes, causing a rushing attack.  
 
d) Sybil attack through forged control packet  
       Each node in a MANET requires a unique address 
to participate in routing, and nodes are identified 
through this address in the network. There is no central 
authority to verify these identities in MANETs. An 
attacker can exploit this property and send control 
packet, for example RREQ or RREP, using different 
identities; this is known as a sybil attack [23].  
4 Our Proposed Mechanism 
4.1 Assumptions 
        We disregard attacks aimed at the physical and 
data link layers. We have not considered attacks from 
colluding intruders in this paper. To illustrate the 
implementation of GIDP we assume a clustered 
MANET organization. We select the most capable 
nodes in terms of their processing abilities as cluster 
heads (CHs) and the others nodes become cluster nodes 
(CNs). At present we assume secure communication 
between CH and CNs. We use ABID to detect intrusion 
in the network; this requires traffic traces that contain 
only normal activities to build a training profile. 
However, in contrast with fixed networks, data 
resources such as [24] that reflect normal activities or 
events are not currently available for MANETs. 
Therefore we assume that the initial behaviour during 
the settling period of the network formed on-the-fly is 
free from anomalies. 
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4.2 GIDP Architecture   
 
Fig.1  GIDP architecture: (a) simplified, left; (b) detailed, right. 
        We now describe our proposed mechanism GIDP. 
This is a hybrid IDP approach that uses a combination 
of anomaly-based and knowledge-based ID. The 
diagram (a) on the left of Fig.1 shows the simplified 
architecture. GIDP monitors the network and collects 
audit data specific for intrusion detection throughout 
the network’s lifespan. Once the network is established, 
training is performed for N time intervals (TI) to obtain 
an initial training profile (ITP). The testing module is 
then called after the training module has run, and this 
continuously tests the network for intrusion detection 
and prevention after each further TI.   
      The detailed architecture of GIDP is represented by 
diagram (b) on the right of Fig.1. During data collection 
a cluster head gathers data in the form of two matrices: 
the network characteristic matrix (NCM) and a derived 
matrix (DM).  The NCM contains data specific to the 
network routing protocol; for example in the case study 
in this paper, the NCM consists of seven parameters:    
 
 NCM= {RREQ (route request), RREP (route reply),       
              RERR (route error), TTL (time to live) values,  
          RREQ src_seq, RREQ dest_seq,  RREP dest_seq}        
 
The DM consists of parameters which reflects the 
network performance and can be derived from NCM 
parameters. Network throughput is also included as a 
parameter in this matrix. In the case study in this paper 
DM consists of four parameters: 
 
 DM= {RPO (routing protocol overhead), PDR (data  
             packet delivery ratio), CPD (number of control  
            packet dropped), Throughput} 
The cluster head (CH) employs two phases: training 
and testing. Fig.2 shows the time-based operation of 
GIDP. When the network is established, the CH 
continuously gathers NCM and DM information and 
applies the GIDP training module for N time intervals 
(TI), resulting in initial training profiles (ITPs) of the 
NCM and DM. The ITPs reflects the normal behaviour 
of the nodes in the network and the expected network 
performance. In the testing phase the CH applies the 
testing module after each TI. The testing phase consists 
of several tasks as shown in Fig.1(b). Firstly it detects 
intrusion in the network. If there is no intrusion in the 
network then it updates the ITPs in order to adapt the 
variation in the network behaviour as time progresses. 
If there is intrusion, in the second task the CH identifies 
the attack or attacks using existing information in the 
knowledge base.  In the case of known attacks the CH 
identifies intruding nodes using existing intruder 
identification rules specific to the known attack in the 
knowledge base. To optimise the probability of 
identifying intruders correctly with a low level of false 
positives, it maintains a test sliding window (TSW) as 
shown in Fig.2, in which d detections of a node are 
required in p time intervals (TI). If this detection 
threshold is passed then the CH will blacklist the node 
and isolate the node by informing all CNs.  
        If attack identification detects an attack that does 
not match the rules for known attacks then the CH 
applies the attack inferences. Attack inference stores the 
rule trace of the current TI as Detected Rule Trace and 
looks for its match in a TSW. If the match is found in a 
TSW then the CH confirms the new attack by 
constructing & adding a rule for the new attack in the 
set of rules stored in knowledge base. 
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Fig.2 Time-based operation of GIDP. 
4.3 Algorithm & Technical Details 
We now explain the GIDP training & testing modules. 
4.3.1 Training 
        The NCM consists of Xi parameters mentioned 
above, where i=1 to 7 and each Xi ={X1, X2, 
X3,…,XM} is a set of random variables from 1 to M, 
where M is the maximum number of random variables 
of parameter Xi.  For example NCM [Xi] represent the 
number of RREQ received by all CNs in the jth time 
interval (TI), where M is the maximum number of 
RREQ received in a jth TI. The probability distribution 
of NCM[Xi] is calculated for the TI. The CH then 
calculates the DM parameters RPO (i.e. the ratio of the 
number of control packet to the number of data packets 
delivered), PDR (i.e. the ratio of the number of data 
packets received to data packet originated), CPD (i.e. 
the number of control packets dropped in establishing 
& maintaining routes in the network) & throughput for 
the jth TI.  This whole process is then repeated for the 
N time intervals in the training phase. We then calculate 
the mean iX of P(NCM[Xi ]) and the means of RPO, 
PDR and CPD for N intervals, and these are stored as 
an ITP (NCM) and ITP (DM) respectively, containing 
the expected values for that particular network observed 
for the total time of N*TI seconds. 
4.3.2 Testing 
         In the testing phase GIDP operates in three stages:  
a) intrusion detection, b) attack identification and 
inferences and c) identification and isolation of 
intruding nodes (Fig.1). We now explain the algorithms 
of stages a, b & c.  For stage a) it employs ABID using 
chi-square goodness of fit test on NCM.  In stages b) 
and c), KBID is applied on both matrices NCM & DM 
using a rule-based approach.  
 
Testing Modules 
This module only takes NCM parameters into account 
and applies the chi-square test to identify any intrusion 
in the network. 
 
a)  Intrusion Detection  
     .  Do after each TI  
         . Collect NCM( X i) from all other CNs in TI, for i 
         . Calculate the probability distribution P (NCM(X i)) 
        .Calculate averages of P(NCM(X i)) & store as observed values          
     . End do 
    .For i  perform hypothesis testing by first calculating 
       chi- computed ( 2[i] using eq.1 ) for Xi  
        Ho[i]: Observed distribution of NCM (Xi  ) fits the expected      
           Ha[i]: Observed distribution of NCM (Xi  ) does not fit expected      
         .If (chi-computed[i] (.d.f[i]) > P-value[i] (.d.f[i]))  
              Reject Ho[i].  endif. 
   .End for 
  .Combined Null Hypothesis Testing 
       Combine Ho: Observed distribution of NCM   fits the expected      
           Combine  Ha: Observed distribution of NCM  does not fit expected 
           .If (combined Ho is rejected)  
               Perform Attack identification & inferences Fig.4 
            else:  Update Expected values  NCM( iX ) ( i.e. ITP(NCM)) 
  .Exit 
     Fig.3 Pseudocode of intrusion detection module. 
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This module continuously monitors the network. In 
each TI the CH first performs hypothesis testing for 
each parameter Xi of NCM at calculated chi-computed 
values obtain from eq.1, where Xi is the parameter of 
NCM and k(1 to M) is the number of random variable 
in each parameter Xi. The CH then performs combined 
hypothesis testing of NCM as shown in Fig.3. If the 
combined Ho is rejected then it assumes intrusion in the 
TI. Else we update the ITP (NCM) using an 
exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA):   
 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1, , ,(1 ) (2)( ) ( ) ( )( )..
M M M
q k q k q k
i i ii X X XNCM NCM NCMα α= ∗ + − ∗∀
 
where ( )1
,
( )
M
q k
i
XN C M  and 
( )1,( )
M
q k
i
XN C M  
represent the expected and observed values for update 
period number (q) respectively. The value of q is 
incremented in the TI when no intrusion in the MANET 
is detected. k represents the random variable from 1 to 
M in each Xi and =2/(q-1) is the weighting factor. As q 
increases the weighting for older data points decreases 
exponentially giving more importance to the current 
observation. 
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b) Attack identification and inferences 
.Read set of rules Fig5 
       .Set up the Interpreter for rule-based approach  
      .Interpreter applies forward-chaining on set of rules Fig.5 
          .If (Any Goal Condition of known attacks are fulfilled)  
               Apply rules for Intruder Identification & Isolation Fig.7   
         .endif. 
        .If (Goal Condition==” POTENTIALUNKNOWNATTACK”)  
             Interpreter applies Attack Inferences Fig.6   
        .endif. 
    . Exit. 
Fig.4 Pseudocode of attack identification & inference  
          module. 
Set of Rules example 
Rule.1 x (chi-squaretest(NCM[x]))-> (CheckDerivedMatrix=TRUE) 
Rule.2 CheckDerivedMatrix  y (Test(DM[y]))->      
              (PotentialAttack=TRUE) 
Rule.3  PotentialAttack  ->(BestRule=TRUE) 
              Best Rules for some known attacks: 
Rule.4  BestRules  (chi-squaretest(NCM[RREQ]))   
              Test(DM[RPO]) ->  “SLEEP DEPRIVATION” 
Rule.5  BestRules  (chi-squaretest(NCM[RREPdest_seq]))   
              (Test(DM[PDR]) V Lowest(PDR) )  -> “BLACKHOLE”  
Rule.6 BestRules  (chi-squaretest(NCM[RREPdest_seq]))   
              (Test(DM[PDR])  -> “GREYHOLE”  
Rule.7 BestRules  (chi-squaretest(NCM[RREQsrc_seq]))   
              (Test(DM[CPD])  -> “RUSHING”              
Rule.8  ¬(x (chi-square-test(NCM[x])))  ¬(y( Test(DM[y]))) -->  
              “POTENTIALFALSEALARM”  
Rule.9  (Rule.1   Rule.2   ¬BestRule)  -> 
              ” POTENTIALUNKOWNATTACK” 
Fig.5 Set of Rule examples in knowledge base. 
 
Attack Inferences  
  . If (Detected Rule Trace is empty) 
      Store Detected Rule Trace = Rule Trace 
    Else If (Rule Trace == Detected Rule Trace) 
               New attack Rule Trace= Rule Trace 
               Construct a rule for New attack Rule Trace 
              Append New attack Rule Trace in set of rule trace  
              Set Detected Rule Trace =Empty . endif 
  .endif 
Fig.6 Pseudocode of Attack inferences. 
 
In case of intrusion the CH calls the Attack 
Identification and Inferences module (Fig.4). This 
module obtains a set of rules from knowledge base, an 
example set being presented in Fig.5. We have 
constructed these rules from our previous work [6] (our 
AIDP simulation results), analyzing various attacks & 
their    impact    on    network    performance     through 
simulations and analysis of existing literature of known 
attacks, for example [12, 14, 15 & 17]. In Fig.5 chi-
square test(NCM[x]) predicate returns true if the 
parameter x is anomalous in NCM. Similarly the 
predicate or propositional function Test (DM[y]) returns 
true if the test on parameter y of DM fails. This test 
uses a tool of Statistical Process Control known as 
variable control chart based on standard deviation . In 
the Attack Identification & Inference module a rule 
based approach is used in which an interpreter can 
either employ forward or backward chaining system. A 
forward chaining system process the rules one by one 
by checking premises (condition in the rule) to reach 
conclusions; it can also draw new conclusions. On the 
other hand backward chaining is goal driven, that is it 
reaches the conclusion first and keeps looking for rules 
that would allow the conclusion.  In GIDP an 
interpreter applies forward chaining on the set of rules, 
Fig.5, at the end looking for the Goal Condition 
fulfilled as described in fig.4.  
c) Intruder Identification &Isolation 
a) Identifying intruding nodes 
          . Obtain known attack Rules for intruder Identification  
           . for all Goal conditions fulfilled:   
        Apply intruder identification rule for each detected known attack 
               add each detected node Vi  to List of Nodes Detected (LND) 
          . endfor 
b) Response Mechanism 
         For all nodes Vi  in LND 
                 . If ( Vi  detections in Potential Intruder List( PIL) > 
                                                  Detections_required_To_ Accuse (d) ) 
                CH: Blacklist Vi & Broadcast Accusation Packet (AP)        
        else :     enter Vi  in PIL     .endif 
   .End for 
c) Accusation Packet (AP) Handling 
       . Each CN Vi maintain its local BlacklistTable (BLT) 
          .if CN Vi receives an AP for CN Vj 
             .If CN Vi has node Vj   in its BLT  then   Ignore AP 
               else:     CN adds node Vj   to its   BLT & rebroadcast AP  
            .endif 
         .endif    
d) Isolating Intruding Nodes 
         .if node Vi receives packet from node Vj 
                 .If node Vj is in node Vi   BLT  
            Ignore packet & drop all packets queued from Vj 
             Else:    handle & process packet    .endif 
         .endif
Fig.7 Pseudocode of intruder identification & isolation 
          module. 
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In case of any known attack detected in the TI, the 
interpreter applies the Intruder Identification & 
Isolation module (fig.7) to identify and isolate the 
intruding nodes. This module first identifies the 
intruding nodes by applying the known attack rules for 
intruder identification. For example in case of a SD 
attack (Fig.5 Rule 4) it employs control chart 
(explained above) based on  of RREQ generated by all 
nodes and adds detected node Vi to the LND. The 
Response Mechanism (Fig.7(b)) then checks if 
detection threshold d is reached for any node Vi in the 
list of nodes detected (LND) in the last p TIs.  If so, 
then it blacklists the node Vi and informs all other CNs 
by sending an Accusation Packet (AP). When a CN 
receives an AP it first checks the broadcast id & source 
address to avoid processing a duplicate AP. If the 
accused node is already blacklisted the CN will ignore 
& drop the AP to prevent unnecessary network traffic. 
Otherwise, the CN will blacklist the accused node and 
rebroadcast the AP.  Finally, to isolate the intruder from 
the network all nodes will not only drop the packets 
from a blacklisted node but also immediately ignore all 
packets in their queue that are from the blacklisted 
nodes, as shown in Fig.7(d).    
       If Goal Condition with POTENTIALUNKNOWNATTACK 
is fulfilled during the attack identification process then 
the interpreter saves this Rule Trace and looks for the 
match of this Rule Trace in the current TSW. If a match 
is found then it confirms the new attack detection by 
constructing a new rule and appending the new rule in a 
Set of Rules stored in the knowledge base (Fig.6). 
 
5 Case Study 
     In this section, we consider a case study with 
different attack scenarios & analysis of GIDP overhead, 
to assess the applicability and performance of GIDP. 
We present the simulation results of these scenarios and 
some key findings from the analysis of attacks. We 
used GloMoSim [26] to build the simulation 
environment, using the simulation parameters shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1 Simulation Parameters 
Number of Nodes                 25            &              50 
500 * 500 metres   &       707 * 707 metres Terrain Dimension  
Node placement Uniform distribution 
Simulation Traffic CBR (Constant Bit Rate) 
Simulation time 2500 seconds 
Routing protocol AODV 
MAC protocol IEEE 802.11 
Mobility Random Way Point Model (RWP) 
Nodes mean speed Varies from 0 to 20 m/s 
In this case study GIDP is assessed using its 
configuration parameters shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 GIDP Configuration Parameters 
Time interval TI 100 seconds 
 Training Period (N) 5 Time Intervals  
Testing Period 20 Time Intervals 
Number of Parameters  NCM =7 & DM=4 parameters 
Chi-square test  () 5% (i.e. 95% confidence interval) 
Test Sliding Window 5 Time Intervals 
Detections-Required-
to-Accuse (d) 
2 in a Test Sliding Window 
Number of Intruders Varies from 1 to 4 
 
5.1 Scenario 1 
In the first scenario we test GIDP with a denial of 
service attack (sleep deprivation) using malicious 
RREQ flooding (MRF), as described in Section 3-a. 
The intruders launch MRF1 or MRF2 attacks. At each 
tested mean speed and for each network size (either 25 
or 50 nodes) we performed 40 runs with no intrusion 
and 40 runs with intruders, using a mix of both MRF1 
and MRF2. 
        The graph in Fig.8a depicts the success rate  (SR)  
and  false  alarm (FA)  rate  of  GIDP as  a function  of  
the  nodes’  mean  speed in  25  &  50 node networks 
with SD attack. By SR here we mean the rate of 
correctly detecting intrusion in the network, identifying 
the attack type and then identifying & isolating the 
node which is causing the attack. A false alarm (FA) 
means that a correctly behaving node has been 
incorrectly identified and isolated. The graph shows 
good performance of GIDP in terms of high SR and low 
FA rates against SD attack. The graph in Fig.8b shows 
the routing protocol overhead in a 25 node network 
when there is a) no attack in the network, b) a sleep 
deprivation attack with no protection and c) a sleep 
deprivation attack with GIDP in place.  The graph 
shows that GIDP reduces the routing protocol overhead 
and increases network performance when it is used in a 
network under sleep deprivation attack. 
5.2 Scenario 2  
In the second scenario we test GIDP with a mix of 
black and grey hole attacks caused by initiating a false 
RREP and then dropping packets as described in 
section 3-b.  In order to  launch  these  attacks,  on 
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Fig.8a Success & false alarm rate of sleep deprivation  
    attack(SD) as a function of nodes’ mean speed 
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Fig.9a Success & false alarm rate of Black & Grey hole  
           attacks (BH, GH) as a function of nodes’ mean 
           speed 
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Fig.9c Data packet delivery ratio with Black & Grey        
    hole attack as a function of nodes’ mean speed 
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Fig.10b Control packet dropped with rushing  
              attack as a function of nodes mean speed (m/s) 
#
#1$
#1!
#1%
#1&
#1"
#1'
#1(
#1)
#1*
$
# " $# $" !#


3
	

	




	

	


	



	




	
	

			

	


	
	!"


				7

	
		
	


	
		7	-5	
Fig.8b Routing protocol overhead with sleep 
deprivation attack as a function of nodes’ mean speed             
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Fig.9b Data packet delivery ratio with Black & Grey  
            hole attacks (BH, GH) as a function of nodes’ 
             mean speed 
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Fig.10a Success & false alarm rate of Rushing attack 
             (RU) as a function of nodes’ mean speed (m/s) 
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Fig.11 GIDP success & false alarm rates with different 
            combinations of attacks  
9 
receiving a RREQ an intruder generates a false RREP 
packet with dest_seq=current dest_seq+f. Through 
simulations we observed that the value of f should be at 
least 5 in a 25 node network, and higher for larger 
networks, because some properly behaving nodes have 
routes fresher than the intruding node for the 
destination node. We also note that the severity of the 
attacks depends on the number of paths in the network 
that the intruder manages to capture. One false RREP 
packet only allows an intruder to capture the route of 
one node in the network, because RREP packets are 
unicast.  
        A single simulation consists of 20 test TIs. We 
monitor the number of false RREP packets (e) 
generated by an intruding node in a simulation and its 
impact on packet delivery ratio. Fig.9c shows that 
increasing the value of e reduces the packet delivery 
ratio during the BH attack and therefore increases the 
severity of the attack. 
        The graph in Fig.9a depicts the SR and FA of 
GIDP with black & grey hole attacks with 8 e <20 and 
5 f  30. The graph in Fig.9b shows the packet 
delivery ratio with no attack, black & grey hole attack 
with no protection and black & grey hole attacks with 
GIDP in place. It shows that GIDP can successfully 
detect these attacks, and identify & isolate the intruding 
node and by doing so GIDP also improves the network 
performance in terms of packet delivery ratio. 
5.3 Scenario 3  
In this scenario we test GIDP with the rushing attack 
through forged RREQ as explained in section 3-c. We 
note that intruders trying to cause rushing attacks by 
sending a forged RREQ with a higher src_seq and 
minimum delay increase the number of routing packets 
(i.e. RREQ+RREP+RERR) dropped in the network. 
Fig.10a shows that GIDP can detect rushing attacks and 
after isolating, the intruder reduces the number of 
routing packets dropped as shown in Fig.10b. 
5.4 Scenario 4  
In the final scenario we assess GIDP with a 
combination of simultaneous attacks launched by 
separate intruders in a simulation. We perform 20 runs 
with each combination of attacks. SR here means that 
GIDP has detected, identified and isolated all the 
intruders causing attacks. FA means GIDP has detected 
and isolated a properly behaving node as an intruder. 
Fig.11 depicts the success rate and false alarm rate of 
GIDP for each of the attack combinations simulated. 
The graph shows the ability of GIDP to detect and 
isolate attacking nodes, and demonstrates the generality 
of our proposed mechanism. During the simulations 
GIDP flagged a POTENTIALUNKNOWNATTACK on a 
few occasions but they did not meet the criteria of 
GIDP attack inferences (i.e. d detections of same rule 
trace in a TSW) (Fig.6)) to mark them as a new attack. 
 
5.5 Analysis of GIDP Overhead  
We now consider the overhead imposed on the 
MANET by GIDP.  We assess the network overhead, 
measured in number of packets (evaluated as number of 
packet generated * number of hop the packet travels) 
generated by GIDP as a function of the nodes’ mean 
speed, and compare it with (a) the AODV routing 
protocol overhead and (b) the network traffic produced 
by the Constant Bit Rate (CBR) connections. CBR 
traffic generated at the application layer during the 
simulation results in User Data Datagram Protocol 
(UDP) traffic at the network layer. GIDP traffic consist 
of the NCM packets sent periodically from CNs to CHs 
and the Accusation Packets generated by CHs to inform 
CNs about the intruders in the network. The AODV 
overhead consists of all the control packets i.e. RREQ, 
RREP and RERR packets generated in the network 
during the simulation. Although packets in these three 
types of packets differ in size, the comparison still gives 
us a useful indication of the relative contributions made 
to the total network traffic. 
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Fig.12 Overhead generated by AODV, GIDP and UDP  
            traffic on the network with no attack. 
 
To analyze the network overhead in terms of AODV, 
GIDP and UDP traffic we first consider a 25 node 
network with no attacking node and then 25 nodes with 
SD attack as an example. We perform 10 runs with 
nodes’ mean speed varying from 0 to 20 m/s. Graphs in 
Fig.12 & Fig.13 shows the contribution made to the 
total network traffic by the three components as a 
function of the nodes’ mean speed with no attack and 
SD attack respectively. We note from the graphs that 
the AODV overhead rises and the UDP traffic falls with 
increasing node mean speed, while the GIDP overhead 
10 
is independent of node speed. The GIDP traffic on 
average contributes to 2.6% of the total network traffic, 
a very low sum.  
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Fig.13 Overhead generated by AODV, GIDP and UDP  
            traffic on the network with SD attack. 
6 Impact of Attacks & 
Intrusion Response 
    We analyze the simulation results of the case study 
of Section 5, where we assess the applicability of GIDP 
to various classes of attacks. We notice that in each 
scenario with a specific attack a certain parameter of 
our derived matrix (DM) is affected most. For example 
in scenario 1 (sleep deprivation attack) the routing 
protocol overhead (RPO) of the network increased 
significantly. In scenario 2 (black & grey hole attacks) 
the data packet delivery ratio (PDR) decreased 
considerably. In scenario 3 (rushing attack) we observe 
the increase in the number of control packets dropped 
(CPD) during the routing operation in the network. This 
indicates that each attack studied has somehow affected 
the network performance, but does not give us a clear 
picture of how severe these individual attacks are for 
the network. Therefore in this section we investigate the 
effects of various attacks and then the impact of 
intrusion response on overall network performance. 
 
6.1 Impact of attacks on network 
performance 
       To evaluate the impact of various attacks on the 
network performance we ensure that the matrix we use 
illustrates changes and effects that are caused by 
specific attacks in MANETs. We use all four 
parameters of our Derived Matrix i.e. Throughput, 
PDR, RPO & CPD, and we model these parameters 
when there is no attack taking place in the network and 
then model them with sleep deprivation (SD), black 
hole (BH) & grey hole(GH), rushing (RU) and sybil 
(SY) attack to measure the network performance 
degradation using equation 3.  
1 2
3 4
* *
* * .....(3)
NPD w Throughput w PDR
w CPO w CPD
= ∆ + ∆ +
∆ + ∆
 
where Wi represents the weights, 
4
1
1i
i
W
=
= . We analyse 
the importance of throughput, PDR, RPO & CPD in 
measuring the overall network performance through 
literature [17, 20, 27] and simulation results. We 
observe that throughput and PDR are more significant 
than RPO and CPD. Therefore, to illustrate the impact 
of attacks and the impact of intrusion response in the 
case study in this paper we use the following weights in 
equation 3: w1=0.5,w2=0.3,w3=0.1 & w4=0.1. In 
equation 3,  represents the percentage change, for 
example Throughput is the percentage change in 
throughput with and without an attack in the network.  
     
6.1.1 Impact of various attacks 
    In this study we used the simulation parameters of 
Table 1. With the 25 node network we first perform 
simulations with no attack in the network and model the 
DM parameters. Keeping the same simulation 
environment we then perform 10 runs with a randomly 
picked node causing a black hole attack in the network 
and estimate the network performance degradation 
(eq.3) when no GIDP is in place. We repeat the same 
process for sleep deprivation, rushing and sybil attack 
with a single attacker. Then the entire process is 
repeated with the 50 nodes network. The graph in 
Fig.14 shows that some attacks are more severe than 
others. Specifically, the black hole attacker has the 
highest impact on network performance. An attacker 
causing sleep deprivation also has a significant impact 
while rushing and sybil attacks have the lowest 
influence on network performance.   
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Fig.14 Impact of various attacks on network  
            performance 
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6.1.2 Impact of combination of attacks 
         In next set of experiments we evaluate the impact 
of combinations of attacks with more than one 
intruders. We experiment with various combinations of 
simultaneous attacks (section 3) launched by separate 
intruders. The graph in Fig.15 shows that the overall 
performance of the network degrades further when 
more than one intruder is present in the network. We 
observe that all combinations with black hole attacks 
have caused more damage to the network than any 
other combinations. We also notice that when we 
analyze each attack independently the sybil attack has 
the least effect on network performance as shown in 
Fig.14, but when it is used with a combination of other 
attacks it has caused a significant impact on network 
performance as shown in Fig.15.  
 
#
"
$#
$"
!#
!"
%#
%"
&#




7



	








	











		


 
Fig.15 Impact of combination of simultaneous attacks 
on network performance 
6.2 Impact of intrusion response on 
network performance 
    When an intrusion is detected and the intruder is 
identified in GIDP the intrusion response is called by 
CH as shown in Fig.1. In response to the intrusion 
GIDP isolates the intruding nodes from the network. To 
get an estimate of the impact of GIDP intrusion 
response (isolation) on network performance, we 
randomly isolate the properly behaving node in the 
network when there is no attack and no GIDP in place 
and evaluate the network performance degradation 
using equation 3.  
                  We first set up a 25 node network using the 
simulation parameters of Table 1 with no attack and no 
GIDP in place. Nodes in the network are set to move 
according to RWP model with mean speed of 5 m/s. 
We perform 10 runs and in each run we randomly 
choose a node and isolate it from the network. We then 
repeat the same process with the 50 node network.   
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Fig.16 Impact of node isolation on network  
             performance in a 25 node network 
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  Fig.17 Impact of node isolation on network  
             performance in a 50 node network 
      The graphs in Fig.16 and Fig.17 depict the impact 
of isolating a randomly picked node on the overall 
network performance of the 25 and 50 node networks 
respectively. In general these graphs illustrate that some 
nodes in the network are more critical than others 
because of their location in the network topology, but 
few nodes have a major role as routing nodes in the 
network, primarily because the nodes are moving and 
therefore the critical routing nodes change with time. 
Isolating the more important routing nodes, for example 
node 5, 6 & 20 in Fig.16, affects more routes in a 
network than other nodes and re-routing causes 
significant routing disruption, which degrades network 
performance considerably. 
       We compare the results of the impact of attacks 
(Fig.14) and the impact of isolating nodes (Fig.16 & 
Fig.17) on network performance.  We note that in some 
cases when attacks are less severe (for example rushing 
or sybil attacks, Fig.14) and nodes are more critical (for 
example nodes 5 or 6, Fig.16), the intrusion response of 
completely isolating these nodes actually results in a net  
degradation of network performance.  Specifically, in 
these cases it is actually better not to punish an 
12 
attacking node by isolating it. In other words, an 
intrusion response should be more flexible and should 
be able to tradeoff between the impact of the attack and 
the impact of isolating the attacker from the network. 
7 Conclusions     
     In MANETs considerable interest has recently been 
devoted to mechanisms that enforce security. Many 
proposals have been made in the literature to secure 
MANETs from various attacks, but most are attack-
specific. Unlike some mechanisms that provide 
protection through authenticated routing, the 
Generalized Intrusion Detection & Prevention 
mechanism that we have proposed in this paper 
monitors both network layer characteristics (NCM) and 
performance statistics (DM).  GIDP uses a combination 
of anomaly-based and knowledge-based ID that can 
protect MANETs against a variety of attacks. 
Simulation results of our case study show that our 
approach can protect MANETs from a wide variety of 
attacks with an affordable processing overhead. We 
also investigated the severity of various attacks and 
their impact on network performance along with the 
impact of the GIDP intrusion response on network 
performance. The results shows that in some cases 
isolating the attacker can cause more harm than good to 
network, hence an adaptive flexible intrusion response 
mechanism is required. This will be our focus of 
research in future. 
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